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Abstract: It's a common idea in philosophy that we possess a peculiar kind of "phenomenal concepts" 
by which we can think about our conscious states in "inner" and "direct" ways, as for example, when I 
attend to the way a current pain feels and think about this feeling as such.  Such phenomenal ways of 
thinking figure in a variety of theoretical contexts.  The bulk of this article discusses their use in a 
certain strategy – the phenomenal concept strategy – for defending the physicalist view that conscious 
states are reducible to brain states.  It also considers, more briefly, how phenomenal concepts have 
been used to defend dualism about consciousness, and how they have been used to explain our special 
access to our consciousness.  It concludes with a discussion about whether, and in what more precise 
sense of the term, we at all possess "phenomenal concepts" of our conscious states. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
'Phenomenal concept' is a technical term that is specified in different ways in the 
literature, but the following general idea can serve as our initial focus.  We can think 
about conscious states – the idea is – under both phenomenal and nonphenomenal 
concepts.  The former are concepts we employ to think about conscious states in 
“inner” and “direct” ways; the latter concepts we employ to think about them in 
“outer” and “indirect” ways.  For example, I employ a phenomenal concept of pain 
when I inwardly attend to the way a current pain feels and think about this feeling as 
such.  For an example of a nonphenomenal concept, consider a case where I think 
“what bothers Sarah must be unpleasant”, not knowing whether Sarah is bothered by a 
pain or something else.  If she is in fact bothered by a pain, then my thought concerns 
that pain, but my concept "gets to" the pain through an outer and indirect route and is 
therefore "nonphenomenal". 
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Phenomenal ways of thinking about consciousness figure in different contexts in 
philosophy.  At present, they are most strongly associated with a certain strategy – the 
phenomenal concept strategy – for defending the physicalist view that conscious 
states are reducible to brain states.  To think about consciousness in inner and direct 
phenomenal ways is very different from thinking about the brain in terms of its 
biological properties.  According to the phenomenal concept strategy, this difference 
in ways of thinking can deceive us into supposing that the thinkings must concern 
different and dissociable things.  But there is no reason to so suppose, because, 
familiarly, different ways of thinking might concern the same thing; as when I think 
about myself in an inner way, as I, and also think about (what turns out to be) myself 
as the shopper who set off the alarm. 
 
However, phenomenal ways of thinking about consciousness have been invoked for 
purposes other than defending physicalism as well.  In direct opposition to the 
phenomenal concept strategy, they have been invoked to defend dualism about 
consciousness.  They have also been invoked to explain our special access to our own 
consciousness. 
 
The bulk of this article concerns the (physicalist) phenomenal concept strategy.  
Section 2 explains what the strategy is, and section 3 discusses some challenges to it.  
Section 3 also illustrates, in passing, the use of phenomenal concepts in arguments for 
dualism.  Section 4 briefly considers how phenomenal concepts have been invoked to 
explain our special access to our own consciousness.  Section 5 summarises and 
extends a bit through a discussion about whether, and in what more precise sense of 
the term, we at all possess "phenomenal concepts" of our conscious states. 
 
A terminological note: Phenomenal concepts are variously said to be concepts of 
“conscious states”, “phenomenal properties”, or of ways that things are subjectively 
“like” for a subject.  For present purposes, we may take these to be equivalent: a 
phenomenal property may be understood as a type of conscious state, or, equivalently, 
as a way that things might be subjectively like for a subject. 
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2 The phenomenal concept strategy 
 
 
2.1 Physicalism and its challenges 
 
According to physicalism, conscious states are reducible to brain states, or other 
physical states.
1
  Reduction is sometimes understood in terms of identity between 
conscious states and brain states; sometimes in terms of necessary connections 
between the two.  But on either understanding, the view is that conscious states are as 
intimately tied to brain states as water is to H2O, liquidity to loose molecular bonding, 
or the global pattern of a pixel grid to the activation of its individual pixels (cf. Lewis 
1994).  It's not just that consciousness is connected to the brain in some regular or 
law-like way; rather, it is in some sense "nothing over and above" what goes on in the 
brain. 
 
It might seem counter-intuitive that our rich inner world of consciousness should be 
thus reducible to brain states.  This (counter-)intuition has also been developed in 
various arguments against or challenges for physicalism, prominent among which are 
the following three. 
 
The explanatory gap (Levine 1983; 2001).  Theoretical reductions seem typically to 
be somehow explanatory.  For example, the "plasma-like" cohesiveness and 
malleability characteristic of liquidity seems to be explained by the loose molecular 
bonding that underlies or is identical with it.  By contrast, it seems that no account of 
what goes on in the brain while I experience red could explain what this is like 
subjectively. 
 
The "appearance of contingency" (see Kripke 1972/1980, 144-155; Chalmers 1996; 
2010).  On the face of it, it seems that the brain state I'm in right now could obtain 
without the conscious state I'm in right now.  If physicalism is true, this is an illusion: 
                                                 
1
 Henceforth, 'brain state' will abbreviate 'brain state or other physical state'.  Physical states that are 
not confined to the brain but that might be part of what consciousness reduces to include states of the 
body (O'Regan and Noë 2001; Noë 2004), and relations to the environment (Dretske 1995, chap. 5; Tye 
1995, chap. 5; 2000, chap. 3; Lycan 2001).  Physical states should here be understood in a broad sense 
that includes for example biological and functional states. 
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the two are in fact inseparable.  But if this is so, how might the illusion of a merely 
contingent connection between the two arise?  What could explain that reality 
presents itself to us in this distorted way? 
 
The challenge for physicalism here is that a standard way of explaining this kind of 
illusion seems not to be available in the present case.  Consider the fact that it seems 
possible for rapid molecular motion to obtain without heat, even though (as it is 
commonly held) this is impossible since heat is molecular motion, and something 
can't fail to obtain without itself.  In this case we can explain the illusory possibility 
by appealing to the idea that we are prone to confusing heat itself, the physical 
phenomenon, with the sensation of heat, which is the way heat appears to us.  It is 
really possible that there could be rapid molecular motion without the sensation of 
heat.  This real possibility together with our tendency to confuse heat itself with the 
way it appears to us can explain our illusory impression that there could be rapid 
molecular motion without heat. 
 
However, in the case of consciousness, we can't distinguish the way it really is from 
the way it subjectively appears; consciousness just is what it's like for a subject.  Thus, 
when I'm under the impression that my current brain state could obtain without my 
current conscious state, there seems to be no other scenario (such as, the brain state 
without the subjective appearance of consciousness) that I plausibly confuse with this 
one.  Therefore, if it is an illusion that consciousness and the brain are merely 
contingently connected, we need a different account of how this illusion arises. 
 
The knowledge argument (Jackson 1982; 1986).  As illustrated by Frank Jackson's 
Mary, it seems in principle possible for someone to (a) know all the physical facts 
about colour vision, and be able to derive all that follows from these facts, while (b) 
not being able to figure out what it's like to see red.  This might seem to show that 
what it's like to see red isn't reducible to physical facts – because if it were, Mary 
should be able to figure out what it's like to see red in virtue of knowing all the 
physical facts and being able to derive all that follows from them. 
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2.2 The phenomenal concept strategy: The general idea 
 
The phenomenal concept strategy is a strategy for responding to such challenges for 
physicalism.  It is a strictly defensive strategy: it operates on the assumption that there 
are good reasons to accept physicalism and aims to fend off apparent reasons for 
rejecting it.
2
 
 
What is it to apply the phenomenal concept strategy to a given challenge to 
physicalism?  As I understand the strategy here, it is to make the following 
Acknowledgment, and develop the following kind of Account of Acknowledgment: 
 
Acknowledgment: The relevant challenge brings out a way in which the 
reduction of conscious states to brain states is exceptional among 
theoretical reductions. 
 
Account: However, the exceptional character of the case can be exhaustively 
explained in terms of our phenomenal concepts of consciousness.  What's 
importantly exceptional about the case are the concepts involved; not the 
phenomena.  (Which is not to say that these concepts are in any way 
deficient; they are just special.) 
 
For example, the phenomenal concept strategy vis-à-vis the explanatory gap is to 
concede that a peculiar gap pertains to the reduction of consciousness to the brain, but 
offer an explanation of this in terms of our phenomenal conceptions.  By the 
physicalist hypothesis, conscious states are physical states, and as physically 
conceived, they can be explained in the way typical of theoretical reductions.  It is 
only as phenomenally conceived that they can't be so explained, but the reason for this 
lies entirely in the phenomenal conceptions. 
 
The approach to the appearance of contingency is similarly to acknowledge that there 
is a peculiar, illusory appearance of contingency about the brain-consciousness 
                                                 
2
 Phenomenal concept theorists typically accept physicalism on the grounds that (a) some conscious 
states have physical effects and (b) all physical effects have complete physical causes.  See for example 
Papineau (2002, chap. 1 and appendix), and Levine (2001, chap. 1)  
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connection – an appearance that can't be explained in terms of some real contingent 
connection between how the brain or consciousness really are and how they present 
themselves to us – but urge that this appearance arises about conscious states only as 
phenomenally conceived, and that it can be exhaustively explained by the character of 
the phenomenal conceptions. 
 
In the case of the knowledge argument, the phenomenal concept strategy is to accept 
that the case of consciousness allows, in a way that's exceptional among theoretical 
reductions, the Mary-style possibility of knowing all the physical facts without being 
able to figure out that it is, subjectively, the way it is to experience red.  The 
explanation offered for this is that someone in Mary's situation would lack the 
phenomenal concept required to know – or even think – the relevant proposition 
concerning what it's like to experience red.  And this is compatible with her knowing 
other propositions, expressible in physical terms, that concern this same fact.  The 
resulting suggestion is that Mary's situation is like that of someone who knows that 
there are two things in front of her but doesn't know – for lack of the relevant concept 
– that the number of things in front of her is the square root of four. 
 
 
2.3 Other physicalist views 
 
The phenomenal concept strategy should be distinguished from two other types of 
physicalist view. 
 
In the first place, Acknowledgment distinguishes the phenomenal concept strategy 
from what we may call nonexceptionalist physicalism.  According to this view, 
consciousness is reducible in a way that is not in any significant way exceptional 
among theoretical reductions.  One example of this view is a broadly applied 
"analytical functionalism" (Lewis 1966; 1972; 1980; Armstrong 1968).  This view 
says that a theoretical reduction is typically accomplished by a "causal-role analysis" 
of some ordinary concept (for example, of liquidity as whatever it is that has such-
and-such typical causes and effects), followed by an empirical discovery of which 
physical phenomenon in fact has those causes and effects (in this case: loose 
molecular bonding).  Broadly applied, the view says that conscious states can be 
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similarly reduced with the help of causal-role analyses of our ordinary concepts of 
them. 
 
Second, the phenomenal concept strategy is distinct from what we may call lack-of-
understanding physicalism.  This view agrees that there is something exceptional 
about the reduction of consciousness, and that this can be accounted for in terms of 
our concepts or theories, but its explanation is that there is something radically 
missing in our current concepts or theories.  The reason that the physical basis of 
consciousness is not perspicuous to us is, according to this view, that our concepts or 
theories fail to adequately capture the relevant phenomena.  Varieties of this view 
have been proposed by Thomas Nagel (1974; 1998; 2000), Colin McGinn (1989; 
2001), and Daniel Stoljar (2005; 2006). 
 
It's worth noting that, while the phenomenal concept strategy and lack-of-
understanding physicalism agree on Acknowledgment as formulated above, there is an 
important underlying disagreement here.  According to lack-of-understanding 
physicalism, there is a theory from the point of view of which the connection between 
the brain and consciousness is explanatory and transparently necessary in the way that 
the connection between, say, liquidity and loose molecular bonding is.
3
  The reduction 
of consciousness is thus in principle "alignable" with the other theoretical reductions, 
whether or not we are now or ever in a position to fully grasp this.  The phenomenal 
concept strategy, by contrast, denies that there is a theory that unifies the brain and 
consciousness in the way familiar from other reductions.  It promises instead an 
explanation of why this is so. 
 
The contrasts with other views bring out some appealing characteristics of the 
phenomenal concept strategy.  By acknowledging that the case of consciousness is 
exceptional among theoretical reductions the strategy pledges to take consciousness 
and the frequently felt puzzlement about it as seriously as anyone can ask; it thus 
avoids a common complaint about nonexceptionalist physicalism.  In suggesting that 
the exceptional features of the case can be explained in terms of a difference among 
(non-deficient) concepts, it simultaneously promises a theoretically conservative 
                                                 
3
 This is emphasised by Nagel (1998, sect. 7; 2000, sect. 6) and McGinn (1989, 353, 361-2; 2001, 299-
301 and passim). 
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account of the case; it thus avoids a common complaint about lack-of-understanding 
physicalism.
4
 
 
 
2.4 Phenomenal concepts: Varieties and commonalities 
 
What might phenomenal concepts be, that they can support the explanatory aims of 
the phenomenal concept strategy?  The literature presents a rich flora of proposals, 
among them that phenomenal concepts are: 
 
(i) recognitional concept that one possesses (partly) in virtue of being able to 
recognise particular instances as being of the same kind (Loar 1990/1997; 
2003; Tye 2000, chap. 2; 2003; Carruthers 2000; 2004; Perry 2001; Levin 
2007a; 2007b); 
(ii) "quotational" concepts that one employs by using the very conscious state 
that one is thinking about (Papineau 1993, chap. 4; 2002, chap. 4; 2007; 
Balog 1999; forthcoming a and b; Melnyk 2002; Block 2007 draws on a 
similar idea); 
(iv) concepts that are distinguished by the special conditions under which one 
is justified in applying them (Sturgeon 1994; 2000, chap. 2; Hill 1997; 
Hill and McLaughlin 1999); 
(iii) indexical concepts, similar to I and now (Tye 1995, chap. 6; Lycan 1996, 
sect. 3.3); 
(v) concepts that don't just label "we know not what" but that present 
conscious states in a peculiarly "substantive and determinate way" 
(Levine 2001, 84); 
(vi) "conditional" concepts that refer to nonphysical states if we have 
appropriate states of this kind, and otherwise refer to physical states 
(Hawthorne 2002; Braddon-Mitchell 2003);
5
 
                                                 
4
 Of course, the phenomenal concept strategy is theoretically conservative only to the extent that its 
account of phenomenal concepts is.  Phenomenal concept theorists typically suppose that phenomenal 
concepts can be accounted for in relatively familiar terms.  However, Levine (2001) is a salient 
exception.  As I read him, Levine combines (a) a phenomenal concept strategy to the problem of 
consciousness with (b) a lack-of-understanding physicalism about phenomenal concepts, urging that 
our current theoretical resources are inadequate to understanding the latter in physical terms.  On the 
grounds for doubting that phenomenal concepts can be physically explained, see section 3.3 below. 
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(vii) concepts that utilise cognitive structures that underlie "sensory 
concepts", inheriting a kind of representational simplicity of the latter 
(Aydede and Güzeldere 2005)
7
 
 
I can't do justice, here, to the variety of ways in which phenomenal concept theorists 
have addressed challenges to physicalism on the basis of these proposals. I shall 
instead identify two ideas that are common to most or all varieties of the strategy. 
 
First, phenomenal concept theorists generally agree that phenomenal concepts – 
however they should exactly be understood – are inferentially isolated from physical 
concepts in the sense that one can't infer a phenomenal characterisation of 
consciousness from a purely physical characterisation, however extensive.  This is to 
reject, among other things, the analytical functionalist view that these concepts can be 
analysed in terms of the typical causes and effects of their referents. 
 
This claim is a fundamental component of all phenomenal concept treatments of the 
explanatory gap and the appearance of contingency.  It is commonly agreed that, if 
one could infer phenomenal characterisations of consciousness from physical 
characterisations of the brain, then there would be no explanatory gap or appearance 
of contingency between the two.  To that extent, at least, the inferential isolation 
between the two kinds of concept explains the gap and the appearance of 
contingency.
8
 
                                                                                                                                            
5
 Stalnaker (2002) develops a similar suggestion, but unlike Hawthorne and Braddon-Mitchell, 
Stalnaker suggests (251-2) that the conditional character is not distinctive of our concepts of 
consciousness, but pertains to concepts that we employ in other theoretical reductions as well; for 
example water.  Since the case of consciousness is thus not claimed to be exceptional, Stalnaker’s 
suggestion is not an instance of the phenomenal concept strategy as understood here (cf. section. 2.2-
2.3). 
7
 These are proposals about what a phenomenal concept might be.  But what is a concept to begin with?  
It is useful to distinguish at least three different uses of this term.  (i) On one use, 'concept' denotes 
inner mental symbols that we, according to one view, use to think with (Fodor 1975; 1998).  (ii) On 
another use, 'concept' stands for certain abstract entities, Fregean Sinne, that compose into propositions 
and make up what we think (for this use of the term, see Peacocke 1992; for more on Sinne, see Frege 
1918/1997).  (iii) On a less committal use of the term, to say that someone "employs a concept" is just 
to say that the person thinks something.  And to say that someone possesses a concept is to say that she 
is able to think something.  This use involves no commitment either about what we think when we 
think, or about what is involved in thinking (cf. Byrne 2005, sect. 1.1; Sundström forthcoming, sect. 
2.4).  For present purposes, we can live with this ambiguity, since one can make sense of the relevant 
issues on each of the three uses. 
8
 The phenomenal concept strategy can at this point be developed in two different ways.  (1) One might 
claim that the inferential isolation of phenomenal concepts by itself suffices to account for the gap and 
appearance of contingency.  This may be the view of Tye (2000; 2003); he at any rate does not appeal 
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Second, phenomenal concept theorists typically claim that phenomenal concepts are 
experience-dependent in the sense that, in order to possess a phenomenal concept of 
some conscious state S one needs to oneself have experienced S. 
 
This claim is a fundamental component of phenomenal concept treatments of the 
knowledge argument.  If phenomenal concepts are experience-dependent, that can 
explain how an experience-deprived subject could know all the physical facts 
(physically conceived) while not knowing – for lack of the relevant concept – what it's 
like to see red (phenomenally conceived). 
 
 
3 Worries about the strategy 
 
 
3.1 Overgeneration 
 
One kind of worry – which one may have either about the strategy in general, or about 
some particular version of it – is that it may seem to overgenerate, in the sense of 
entailing false predictions about what identity or necessity claims we find 
troublesome. 
 
A version of this concern can be extracted from Stoljar (2005; 2006, sect. 9.6.2).  
Stoljar remarks (in effect) that when some peculiar feature F pertains to some concept 
C, F is often inherited by complex concepts that C partly constitutes.  For example, if 
C is inferentially isolated from all concepts of a certain kind, it's plausible that the 
                                                                                                                                            
to any feature of phenomenal concepts other than inferential isolation in accounting for the gap (2000, 
32-5; 2003, § 7) or for concerns around the appearance of contingency (2000, 29-32; 2003, § 5).  It 
may also be the view of Diaz-Leon (forthcoming, sect. 3.2 and 3.4).  Alternatively, (2) one might claim 
that the inferential isolation partly accounts for the gap and the appearance of contingency, but that 
something further must be identified to provide the full account.  This is held by Loar (1990/1997), 
Levine (2001), and Papineau (2002).  The motivation for this view is that there seem to be cases where 
(a) an identity or necessary connection is established between phenomena, and (b) our characterisations 
of these are inferentially isolated from one another, but where (c) we don't find any explanatory gap or 
appearance of contingency; at any rate, no gap or appearance of contingency that we find bothersome.  
This seems to be so, for example, in cases involving demonstrative reference, like "this stuff is 
CH3CH2OH" (cf. Loar 1990/1997, 608). 
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concept not-C is inferentially isolated from these concepts as well.  Now consider the 
following statement: 
 
NumberNoRed: If something is a number then it's not an experience of red. 
 
We can stipulate that (i) experience of red should here be conceived phenomenally.  
Moreover, it seems plausible that (ii) whatever "disparity" there is between 
phenomenal concepts and physical concepts, there is also between phenomenal 
concepts and mathematical concepts.  Given (i) and (ii), it would seem that: if, as the 
phenomenal concept strategy says, it is some disparity between phenomenal concepts 
and physical concepts that makes the brain-consciousness connection appear to us 
contingent, then NumberNoRed should also appear to us contingent.  However, 
NumberNoRed doesn't appear to us contingent.  It is, and appears necessary.  
Therefore, the phenomenal concept strategy seems to entail an incorrect prediction.
9
 
 
Sundström (2008) raises the same type of objection against Papineau's "quotational" 
phenomenal concept account of the intuition of brain-consciousness distinctness. 
 
 
3.2 Conceiving consciousness as it is in itself and the threat of "deconstruction" 
 
As noted above, it seems that in the case of consciousness there is no distinction 
between how it subjectively appears and how it really is.  Phenomenal concept 
theorists tend to accept this; it is part of what they typically concede to the challenge 
from the appearance of contingency, for example (cf. sections 2.1 and 2.2 above). 
 
Terence Horgan and John Tienson (2001) argue that the phenomenal concept strategy 
– or what they call "new wave materialism" – "deconstructs" under this concession.  
Their argument runs as follows: 
 
                                                 
9
 See Diaz-Leon (2008, sect. 3) for a response to this worry. 
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1 When a phenomenal property is conceived under a phenomenal concept, 
this property is conceived otherwise than as a physical-functional 
property. 
2 When a phenomenal property is conceived under a phenomenal concept, 
this property is conceived directly, as it is in itself. 
3 If (i) a property P is conceived, under a concept C, otherwise than as a 
physical-functional property, and (ii) P is conceived, under C, as it is in 
itself, then P is not a physical-functional property. 
Hence, 
4 Phenomenal properties are not physical-functional properties (2001, sect. 
3). 
 
The argument is valid, and its conclusion contradicts physicalism.  According to 
Horgan and Tienson, "new wave materialists are committed to premises 1 and 2".  
They can therefore contest only premise 3.  Their problem, however, is that 3 "seems 
virtually tautologous" (2001, sect. 3).
11
 
 
I suspect that Horgan and Tienson are only partly right about where new wave 
materialists or phenomenal concept theorists may contest the deconstructive 
argument.
12
  I believe there is a crucial disagreement about the interpretation under 
which premise 2 is correct, and that this disagreement underlies any disagreement 
about 3. 
 
It is true that phenomenal concept theorists tend to accept wordings like that of 
premise 2.  For example, Brian Loar says that a phenomenal concept picks out its 
referent "directly and essentially" (1990/1997, 600).  Katalin Balog says that 
phenomenal concepts "provide a grasp of the phenomenal properties in a way that 
reveals their essence" (forthcoming b, sect. 2).  And Brian McLaughlin, in a response 
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 Goff (forthcoming) develops a similar objection to the phenomenal concept strategy. 
12
 There is room for discussion about whether "new wave materialism", as Horgan and Tienson 
understand it, is exactly the same as or slightly different from the "phenomenal concept strategy" as 
understood here.  For present purposes we can disregard most of the (potential) differences between the 
views.  But one should note that Horgan and Tienson's argument targets strategies for defending 
identity physicalism specifically.  Due to limitations in space, I can't here discuss how the argument 
might be extended to challenge the view that brain states and conscious states are (merely) necessarily 
connected. 
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to Horgan and Tienson's argument, concedes that: "New wave materialists … embrace 
premise 2: it is one of the central tenets of their view" (2001, 324). 
 
However, it turns out that Loar, Balog, and McLaughlin all have serious reservations 
about the sense in which our phenomenal conceptions "reveal the essences" of 
phenomenal properties.  McLaughlin urges that phenomenal concepts "do not 
conceptually reveal anything about the essential nature of phenomenal properties: 
they simply name or demonstrate them" (2001, 324), and that phenomenal concepts 
"present phenomenal properties only in the sense that they directly refer to 
phenomenal properties (2001, 328).  Loar distinguishes two different uses of 'capture 
the essence of': 
 
On one use, it expresses a referential notion that comes to no more than 
'directly rigidly designate'.  On the other, it means something like 'be 
conceptually interderivable with some theoretical predicate that reveal the 
internal structure of the designated property'" (1990/1997, 603). 
 
Loar only ever acknowledges that phenomenal concepts "capture the essence" of 
phenomenal qualities in the former sense (see, e.g., 608-9).  And Balog states that 
phenomenal concepts "will not afford any clue as to the fundamental nature of the 
referent".  While they "afford an insight into the essence of the referent", the sense in 
which they do so is "by exemplification"; i.e., in the sense that phenomenal concepts 
use phenomenal properties to think about phenomenal properties (forthcoming b, sect. 
2). 
 
Given these reservations, it is not clear that Loar, McLaughlin and Balog accept that 
we conceive phenomenal properties "as they are in themselves" in the sense that 
Horgan and Tienson intend in premise 2.  Horgan and Tienson have in mind, I 
believe, something like an insight into, or understanding of the essential nature of 
phenomenal properties.  But to say that we refer to phenomenal properties "directly" 
or "rigidly" or "by exemplification" is not to accept any such thing.  We can plausibly 
(a) refer to something directly or rigidly or by exemplification while (b) lacking 
insight into the essential nature of what we refer to.  Consider for example a set of 
differently shaped cardboards attached to sticks.  I may lift one of the cardboards by 
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its stick without looking at it and say, "now look at this (type of) shape".  It is 
plausible, I think, that I can in this case refer directly, and rigidly, and by 
exemplification to a type of shape while having little insight into its essential nature.  
It seems natural to interpret Loar's, McLaughlin's and Balog's reservations about the 
"essence revealing" character of phenomenal concepts, and their emphases instead on 
"directness", "rigidity" and "exemplification", as nods towards some such model for 
understanding how we grasp conscious states under phenomenal concepts.
13
 
 
This dispute concerning premise 2 underlies, I think, any disagreement concerning 
premise 3, which says, to repeat: 
 
3. If (i) a property P is conceived, under a concept C, otherwise than as a 
physical-functional property, and (ii) P is conceived, under C, as it is in 
itself, then P is not a physical-functional property. 
 
If our phenomenal conceptions should display phenomenal properties "as they are in 
themselves" in the sense that Horgan and Tienson are after, this might well be 
"virtually tautologous".  But if phenomenal conceptions display phenomenal 
properties "as they are in themselves" only in the sense that Loar, McLaughlin and 
Balog grant, there may be little reason to accept 3.  At any rate, to the extent that 
phenomenal concept reference should be modelled on the kind of "directness", 
"rigidity" or "exemplification" illustrated by the cardboard case, there seems to be 
little reason to accept it.  It seems that I can in this case refer to a certain shape 
directly, rigidly and by exemplification, and conceive it "otherwise than as" three-
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 The model may be imperfect.  In the cardboard case, the direct, rigid, and exemplificatory reference 
is to a high degree "cognitively blind"; I just refer to whatever shape it is that I in fact display.  
Meanwhile, Loar, McLaughlin, and Balog emphasise that phenomenal concept reference involves a 
"substantive", or "non-blind", or "non-naked" mode of presentation of conscious states (Loar 
1990/1997, sect. 4-5; McLaughlin 2001, 326; Balog forthcoming b, sect. 2).  But if that's the idea, there 
may be no close analogies from other cases to appeal to.  It is not easy (for me) to think of a case such 
that: (a) I have a "non-blind" grasp of some property, and (b) this property is grasped as it is in itself 
(rather than in terms of some contingent, superficial appearance), while (c) I nonetheless lack the kind 
of insight into the essential nature of the property that Horgan and Tienson appear to be after in premise 
2.  Loar, McLaughlin and Balog may well suppose – or be committed to supposing – that phenomenal 
concept reference uniquely exemplifies (a)-(c).  For an argument that phenomenal concept theorists 
should construe phenomenal concept reference as "cognitively blind", see Levin (2008).  Hawthorne 
(2002, 44-5) may perhaps be read as suggesting this as well. 
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sided, in the argument's intended sense;
14
 but for all that, three-sidedness may be part 
of the essence of the shape referred to. 
 
We may note in passing that Horgan and Tienson's argument in effect illustrates the 
above mentioned idea of invoking phenomenal concepts to defend dualism.  While 
presented as an ad hominem argument against "new wave materialists", whom Horgan 
and Tienson portray as wedded to premises 1 and 2, one might promote the argument 
and its anti-physicalist conclusion as plausible independently of new wave materialist 
commitments.  A dualist argument in this spirit is developed by Nida-Rümelin (2007).  
As both Horgan and Tienson, and Nida-Rümelin note, their arguments are similar to 
other influential arguments for dualism, such as Kripke's (1972/1980) "modal 
argument", Chalmers' (1996; 2010) "two-dimensional argument", and the "property 
dualism argument" (White 1986; 2007; see also Smart 1959, 148-50). 
 
 
3.3 Are phenomenal concepts themselves physically explicable? 
 
The phenomenal concept strategy aims to show that concerns about the physical 
nature of consciousness can be explained in terms of phenomenal concepts.  But what 
about the phenomenal concepts themselves: can we give a satisfactory account of 
their nature in physical terms? 
 
Joseph Levine (2001; 2007) argues that phenomenal concepts provide us with a 
peculiarly thick and substantive mode of presentation of conscious experiences, and 
that we presently lack the resources to understand how this kind of representation 
could be physically realised.  A physicalist is according to Levine confined to explain 
representation in terms of causal and nomological notions.  And it seems hopeless to 
explain the kind of access that we have to our conscious experiences in these terms. 
 
David Chalmers (2007) provides a related "master argument" against all varieties of 
the phenomenal concept strategy.  The conclusion aimed for is:  
                                                 
14
 Of course, I don't in this case conceive the shape as not three-sided.  But I conceive it and I don't 
conceive it as three-sided.  And that suffices, it seems, for conceiving it "otherwise than as three sided" 
 16 
 
Chalmers' Conclusion: Phenomenal concepts are bound to be characterised 
either (i) so "thinly" that they fail to account for our "epistemic situation" 
with regard to consciousness, or (ii) so "thickly" that they can't be 
explained in physical terms. 
 
The argument is developed around the question whether it is coherently conceivable 
that there be physical duplicates of us that lack our phenomenal concepts.  If this is 
coherently conceivable, then, Chalmers argues, phenomenal concepts are not 
physically explicable; they themselves generate the kind of explanatory gap they were 
supposed to explain (sect. 3.1).  Suppose on the other hand that it is not coherently 
conceivable that physical duplicates of us lack phenomenal concepts.  That would be 
to say that zombies (physical duplicates of us without consciousness) are guaranteed 
to have whatever phenomenal concepts we have.  But, Chalmers argues, zombies are 
not in the kind of epistemic situation that we are in with regard to consciousness.  For 
example, when zombie-Mary leaves her black-and-white room, she does not gain 
knowledge that is as "cognitively significant" as the knowledge that conscious Mary 
acquires in the corresponding situation.  Therefore, on this supposition, phenomenal 
concepts don't explain our epistemic situation with regard to consciousness (sect. 3.2). 
 
Responses to Chalmers' argument have typically in one way or other developed the 
following idea.  By the physicalist hypothesis, conscious states as well as our 
phenomenal conceivings of conscious states are physical phenomena.  And, just as we 
can conceive of our conscious states in both phenomenal and nonphenomenal ways, 
so we can conceive of our phenomenal conceivings in these two ways.  As an instance 
of this, Chalmers' Conclusion can be read in two ways, depending on whether it 
employs a phenomenal or a nonphenomenal concept of phenomenal concepts. 
 
One way to develop this idea is to urge that Chalmer's Conclusion is false if 
phenomenal concepts are physically conceived.  Physically conceived, phenomenal 
concepts can be physically explained.  But they can also explain our epistemic 
situation, according to this suggestion.  Although zombie-Mary has no conscious 
                                                                                                                                            
in Horgan and Tienson's sense.  They stress that conceiving of a property "otherwise than as" so-and-so 
is "different from, and weaker than" conceiving it "as otherwise than" so-and-so (note 4). 
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experience, she acquires on release from her confinement concepts that are novel to 
her to a degree that parallels Jackson's Mary (see Carruthers and Veillet 2007; 
Papineau 2007, sect. 5.4; Levin 2008, sect. 2). 
 
Another response, developed by Balog (forthcoming b), urges that Chalmers' 
Conclusion is true but harmless for the phenomenal concept strategy on both the 
phenomenal and the nonphenomenal reading.  Chalmers' Conclusion is true if 
phenomenal concepts are physically conceived because, while phenomenal concepts 
thus conceived can be physically explained, they don't explain our epistemic situation.  
But this is something that a phenomenal concept theorist "should insist" on (sect. 3).  
Chalmers' Conclusion is true if phenomenal concepts are phenomenally conceived 
because, while phenomenal concepts thus conceived explain our epistemic situation, 
they can't be physically explained.  But this new explanatory gap – between physical 
facts (physically conceived) and phenomenal concepts (phenomenally conceived) – 
"doesn't pose a challenge to the physicalist over and above the original explanatory 
gap" (ibid.). 
 
Diaz-Leon (forthcoming) also suggests that Chalmers’ Conclusion is, even if true, 
harmless for the phenomenal concept strategy.  A phenomenal concept theorist need 
not, she argues, account for our “whole epistemic situation” with regard to 
consciousness, but only for the “inferential disconnection” between physical and 
phenomenal concepts (sect. 3.2). 
 
 
4 First-person psychology and epistemology 
 
Besides being invoked to defend physicalism or dualism, phenomenal concepts have 
been invoked, by both physicalists and dualists, to explain psychological and 
epistemic phenomena such as: 
 
(a) our peculiar direct acquaintance with our own consciousness; 
(b) the fact that we seem to gain knowledge about our own consciousness in 
ways not accessible from a third-person perspective; 
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(c) the fact that we seem to be infallible or incorrigible about some 
judgments about our own consciousness; for example, judgments that one 
would naturally express in terms like, "I have this kind of experience 
right now". 
 
Balog (forthcoming a, sects. 3-4) offers an explanation of such phenomena based on 
the "constitutional account" according to which phenomenal concepts use phenomenal 
properties to refer to phenomenal properties.  Chalmers (2003, sect. 4.1) draws on a 
similar account to justify an incorrigibility thesis according to which a certain class of 
phenomenal beliefs can't be false.
15
 
 
The merits of these accounts can't be discussed here.  However, it is worth noting that, 
contrary to what is sometimes suggested,
16
 it is not apparent that phenomena like (a)-
(c) should be explained in terms of phenomenal concepts, or in terms of concepts at 
all.  Another possibility is that they should be explained by some non-concept 
involving access, like an inner experience, on the basis of which we apply concepts to 
our conscious states.
17
 
 
 
5 So, do we possess phenomenal concepts of our conscious states? 
 
So, do we possess phenomenal concepts of our conscious states?  Whether we should 
say so depends, of course, on what we mean by 'phenomenal concept'. 
 
On a broad understanding, a concept is phenomenal if and only if it concerns a 
conscious state.  It is relatively uncontroversial that we possess phenomenal concepts 
in this sense.
18
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 See also Papineau (2002, sect. 4.12) for a similar suggestion. 
16
 See, e.g., Balog (2009, 299). 
17
 This is analogous to the proposal that our access to our outer environment is established by non-
concept involving perceptions, on the basis of which we apply concepts.  For general overviews of such 
"conceptualist" versus "nonconceptualist" debates, see Toribio (2007) and Bermúdez and Cahen 
(2008).  Gunther (2003) is an important collection of texts. 
18
 Exactly how controversial it is depends on what one means by 'concept'; cf. note 7 above. 
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But as we have seen, philosophers typically mean something more specific than this 
by 'phenomenal concept': the term is strongly associated with the idea that we possess 
concepts of our conscious states that are in one way or other very special, or even 
unique.  We have encountered several proposals about what this specialness might 
consist in.  Three important suggestions are that these concepts: 
 
(i) are inferentially isolated from physical concepts; 
(ii) are experience-dependent, in the sense that, to have a concept of a type of 
conscious state S, one needs oneself to have experienced S; 
(iii) provide us with a grasp of what conscious states are in themselves. 
 
It should be recognised, I believe, both that (i)-(iii) are all controversial, and that it's 
controversial whether either one entails that the relevant concepts are unique.  I will 
conclude by summarising and discussing the suggestions, in a somewhat reshuffled 
order. 
 
Regarding the suggestion (i) that we possess concepts of consciousness that are 
inferentially isolated from physical concepts, this is disputed by at least some 
"analytical functionalists" (cf. section 2.3).  But even supposing it is true, it is hard to 
see that this would make the relevant concepts unique.  As several phenomenal 
concept theorists have pointed out, indexical and demonstrative concepts are plausibly 
inferentially isolated from physical concepts as well, and the same may be true of, 
say, natural kind concepts like water and heat (Loar 1990/1997, 608; Levine 2001, 82-
3, and sect. 2.4-2.5). 
 
Regarding the suggestion (iii) that the relevant concepts provide us with a grasp of 
what consciousness is in itself, I have suggested that verbal agreements over such 
phrases often hide substantive disagreements.  Some take this to mean that 
phenomenal concepts provide us with something like an insight into the essence of 
consciousness.  Others, it seems, take it to mean only that phenomenal concepts refer 
to conscious states directly or rigidly, or that their uses exemplify consciousness. 
 
On either of these interpretations of (iii), it is again doubtful that, if true, it would 
make phenomenal concepts unique.  We plausibly refer directly and rigidly by means 
 20 
of proper names and demonstratives,
19
 and by exemplification when we use quoted 
words to refer to words.  It may also be plausible that we have theoretical concepts – 
like an educated person’s concept of electron – that amount to insights into the 
essences of what we conceive.  The same might be true of many mundane concepts, 
like sofa or friend. 
 
The experience-dependence claim, (ii), is also controversial.  A long-standing 
objection to this kind of claim draws on the possibility of certain "duplication" 
scenarios.  Take the physical state that I was in last night as I fell asleep in the dark.  It 
is in principle possible that a molecule-for-molecule copy of me in that state should be 
created, by design or accident, out of "nothing".  The result would be a creature that 
had never experienced any colour.  But it seems plausible that the creature would 
possess any concepts that I possess of what it's like to experience colours (Unger 
1966; Dennett 2005, chap. 5). 
 
This objection targets theses to the effect that it is absolutely impossible to have to 
relevant kind of concept without the relevant kind of experience.  It doesn't threaten 
nomological theses, like the claim that this kind of concept-acquisition is ruled out by 
the psychological laws of normal human development.
20
 
 
But we should recognise this "anthropological" experience-dependence thesis to be 
controversial as well.  Analytical functionalists can contest it on the grounds that 
causal role concepts can plausibly in general be acquired in ways other than by 
experience.  Another recent challenge comes from (overlapping) arguments by 
Michael Tye (2009, sect. 3.6) and Derek Ball (2009).
21
  Tye and Ball argue that our 
concepts of consciousness can be possessed even if one only "partially understands" 
them, and that one can therefore acquire them from others even if one has not been in 
the states they concern.
22
 
 
                                                 
19
 Cf. Kripke (1972/1980), and Kaplan (1989). 
20
 Compare: Duplication possibilities may show that it is in principle possible to become a passable 
speaker of Japanese without being exposed to Japanese.  But it still seems to be a reliable, law-like, 
psychological generalisation that all speakers of Japanese have been exposed to Japanese. 
21
 Tye is of course a former phenomenal concept theorist, but has turned into a critic in his 2009 book. 
 21 
A further challenge to the anthropological experience-dependence view comes from 
Hume's missing shade of blue.  If you experience a wide enough range of colours, that 
plausibly suffices to acquire any concept of light blue that I possess, even if you 
haven't experienced light blue in particular.  Indeed, this may be how we typically, in 
fact acquire our concepts of sensory states: given a varied enough sample we "fill in" 
the rest.  If so, it is not the case, even as an anthropological matter, that you must have 
been in conscious state S to have a phenomenal concept of S.
23
 
 
Finally, even if (ii) should be true – either as an absolute or an anthropological matter 
– there is again room for doubt that this would make phenomenal concepts of 
consciousness unique.  Insofar as it's plausible that we have concepts of conscious 
states that require having experienced these states, something analogous may well be 
plausible for certain (demonstrative, or "perceptual") concepts of features of our 
environment.
24
 
 
So, as often in philosophy, there is little uncontroversial ground to occupy in the 
territory around "phenomenal concepts".
25
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